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Abstract: This paper proposes an alternative to the traditional model of supply and demand in 
markets where consumers take prices as given. Within the framework of “no side payments 
and partial preplay communication” firms are assumed to decide non-cooperatively on 
production and marketing while the market price is set by a competitive price leader, i.e. a 
firm preferring the lowest market price. Predictions include excess supply and a revenue-
maximizing market price in markets where production precedes sales. In markets where sales 
precede production competitive price leadership predicts monopoly pricing but not 
necessarily monopoly profits if firms are “sufficiently similar”, while the presence of firms 
with high costs or low capacities will make it possible for the price leader, in some circum-
stances, to increase its market share and also its profits by reducing its price. And the threat of 
costly competition for market shares may reduce the market price even for identical firms. 
 
Keywords: Pricing, oligopoly, price leadership, market sharing 
JEL classification: L13 Oligopoly 
  
                                                 
*This paper reports results from a project with a long history, starting with my thesis in 1986 and including a 
break from 1996 to 2008. Discussions with Jörgen Weibull and Henrik Horn during the first phase were very 
valuable. I would also like to thank Mats Bergman and participants of seminars at Stockholm University and 
Åbo Akademi University, and in particular Jim Albrecht, Mahmood Arai, Torsten Persson, Rune Stenbacka, 
Lars E.O. Svensson, Susan Vroman, Eskil Wadensjö and Johan Willner for useful comments on earlier versions.   1
1. Introduction 
Fundamental to economics is the notion of a market price determined by supply and demand. 
To give substance to this proposition when price-setting is decentralized to profit-maximizing 
firms one must show, firstly, why and how firms choose the same price and, secondly, that 
this price is determined by the market’s demand and supply curves. This we shall do in the 
present paper. But we shall also see that the market price is not necessarily determined by 
equality between demand and supply. 
  Our point of departure is the traditional text-book model, where not only all buyers but 
also all sellers are price-takers. The demand curve describes what buyers are willing to buy at 
various prices, and the supply curve describes what sellers are willing to supply at various 
prices on the assumption that they can sell what they like. And then excess supply is supposed 
to trigger a process of price adjustment where firms try to sell their excess supplies by cutting 
prices until the market clears. 
  Now, suppose that producers do take a market price as given during the market period, 
even when it implies excess supply. Then they can no longer stick to the presumption that 
they can sell everything they produce. Instead they will realize that there is rationing and they 
will adapt to this. But how are producers rationed, or, in other words, how will the market be 
shared? This question is answered in Section 3 for markets where production precedes sales 
(where excess supply may arise in equilibrium after output adjustment) and in Section 4 for 
markets where sales precede production (where excess supply is excluded by definition). And 
it turns out that market sharing is a crucial element in a theory of price formation. 
  Having derived firms’ profits as functions of the market price, in equilibrium after 
adjustment of production or marketing, we can formulate an alternative principle of price 
adjustment, namely that the market price goes down if and only if a price cut appears 
profitable to a firm even if its competitors follow suit, while the market price goes up if and 
only if a higher market price is profitable to every firm. 
  This means that the market price is determined by the lowest market price preferred by a 
firm, an idea which goes back at least to Boulding (1941 p. 610). What’s new here is the 
emphasis on market sharing and its consequences for price formation. 
  More precisely, we shall consider a market form where the market price is set by a price 
leader in the beginning of the market period. When all firms prefer the same market price, the 
choice of price leader is immaterial, and then we have a barometric price leader, i.e. a price 
leader who “commands adherence of rivals to his price only because, and to the extent that, 
his price reflects market conditions with tolerable promptness” (Stigler 1947). It might be   2
thought that the market price will always be monopolistic in this case, but competition in 
other variables than prices will often enforce a lower market price, as we shall see in this 
paper. And when price preferences differ, and the market price is set by a firm preferring the 
lowest market price, I will call this firm a competitive price leader. 
  This version of price leadership will be developed successively in the following sections 
within the framework of “no side payments and partial preplay communication”, which Luce 
and Raiffa (1957 p. 169) once characterized as the most surprising omission in the literature 
on games. More precisely, I do assume that firms decide non-cooperatively on production or 
marketing, but I do not assume that they also decide non-cooperatively on prices. My reason 
for this approach is simply that firms cannot decide non-cooperatively on both prices and 
quantities, as shown in Appendix 1. Appendix 1 also reviews some of the literature on non-




We assume that consumers are free to choose among producers (consumer sovereignty), 
excluding, for instance, the possibility for producers to fix market shares. We also assume that 
consumers take prices as given, excluding haggling or bargaining. The exclusion of haggling 
reduces transaction costs and facilitates price comparisons. By excluding bargaining we 
exclude the possibility for consumers to organize and bargain with producers over prices. And 
when consumers take prices as give, there is a well-defined demand function, which 
determines what consumers buy at a given market price. We assume that this demand function 
is decreasing in the market price (so that its inverse exists) and that its price-elasticity is non-
decreasing and greater than 1 for some price. 
  For simplicity we assume throughout the paper (with one exception) that a firm’s marginal 
cost is constant up to a certain fixed capacity. In other words, assuming that it can sell 
everything produced, a firm’s supply is equal to its capacity for every market price higher 
than its marginal cost (and is otherwise 0 or indeterminate). However, this supply should 
perhaps be called potential supply, since it may differ from what the firm actually supplies. A 
firm’s potential supply will usually be called its capacity in this paper, where there will be an 
important difference between excess supply and excess capacity, and an important difference 
between market clearing and capacity clearing. 
  When it comes to rules for price formation, let us modify the classical price-taking 
postulate as little as possible. Thus we assume that prices are taken as given during the market   3
period not only by all consumers but also by all producers. We also assume that all producers 
except one take prices as given at the beginning of the market period. The choice of price 
leader is immaterial when all firms prefer the same price, while we assume that the price 
leader is the firm preferring the lowest market price when price preferences differ (excluding 
the possibility of side payments). This is a well-defined market form which I will call 
competitive price leadership (which includes barometric price leadership as a special case). 
  Now, what is a market form and how can it be observed? A market form is a set of rules 
for price formation which determines a market price. Examples of market forms which are 
easy to observe include Walras markets, where an auctioneer first asks for demand and supply 
at various market prices and then sets that price which clears the market. And there are plenty 
of such markets, including markets for gold and securities. Second, there are Cournot markets, 
where there also is an auctioneer, but an auctioneer who doesn’t ask for demand and supply 
before announcing the price but sets that price which equals demand to that supply which has 
been brought to the market place. Such markets also exist, namely markets for agricultural 
products and other raw materials. Third, there are Bertrand markets, where firms 
independently and simultaneously commit to prices. Such markets also exist, but only in 
markets with big buyers, like in construction. And Bertrand models should be appropriate for 
industries with sealed bidding and excess capacity, as emphasized by Shapiro (1989 p. 351). 
  How can price leadership be observed? A necessary condition which is particularly easy 
to observe is that there is not an auctioneer in the market or a big buyer enforcing sealed 
bidding. Moreover, when market conditions change there should be a short period of price 
adjustment. This may be initiated by one of the firms and followed by the other firms in the 
market, in which case price leadership is particularly obvious. Even if firms simultaneously 
announce new list prices, price leadership is obvious if some firms adjust their prices after the 
initial announcement. And if there is no adjustment at all this may be a sign of particularly 
good coordination (when all firms prefer the same market price and the choice of price leader 
is immaterial). It cannot be interpreted as a price cartel unless some firms object to the price 
agreement and would have preferred a lower market price. 
  Of course, the existence of price leadership can also be observed indirectly by checking its 
predictions. These include, as we shall soon see, market clearing or capacity clearing in some 
cases, excess supply in some situations and, above all, in many cases mark-up pricing with a 
mark-up over variable costs which depends on the price elasticity of demand.     
  However, checking these mark-up formulas presupposes information on the price 
elasticity of demand which may be difficult to find for a researcher and even more difficult to   4
find for a firm. And even if a producer is able to exploit inelastic demand it is not certain that 
she always is willing to do it. 
  A crucial point when checking the predictions of competitive price leadership is 
consequently whether a mark-up depends on the price elasticity of demand or not. And “not” 
in many cases means full cost pricing, implying that firms set prices to cover all costs, 
including capital costs, where the contribution of capital costs to the price is obtained by 
dividing capital costs for the market period by estimated sales. 
  Now, a mark-up according to full cost pricing is not necessarily profit-maximizing. To see 
this, consider a monopoly with marginal cost c, capacity K and capital costs rK. Suppose, for 
simplicity, that the demand curve is linear, with  ( ) 0 Dc m c + = , where m measures the 
steepness of the demand curve. Then it is easy to verify that 
(1)   ( ) ( )( ) 1 Dp Dc x = − , 
(2)   () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 pc D p m c D c x x −= − , 
(3)   where pcx m c = +  with 01 x ≤ ≤ , 
so that  () ( )( ) max 4 pc D p m c D c −=  for  12 x = . It follows that, if the firm sets a mark-up 
on the assumption that its sales will be equal to its capacity, its mark-up rK cK  will not be 
profit-maximizing unless  2 rc m = . And then sales will not be equal to capacity unless 
()2 KD c = . 
  Moreover, for a given mark-up xm μ =  the firm’s profits will be positive if and only if 
(4)   () 1 mcD c rK
mm
μμ ⎛⎞ −> ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
, 
which, if rc μ = , is equivalent to 








Thus, full cost pricing ( rc μ = ) yields positive profits if demand is sufficiently inelastic. And 
as long as profits are positive it may be rational for the firm to be satisfied with full cost 
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3. Price formation in markets where production precedes sales 
In this section we focus on markets where production precedes sales. We begin with an 
atomistic market, where firms are too small to perceive any influence on aggregate output, 
and then proceed to a market with an arbitrary number of firms. 
 
3.1 Price formation in atomistic markets
1 
Define supply  () Spat the market price p in the usual way as aggregate competitive supply, 
i.e.  () () j Sp s p =∑ , where individual supply ( ) i sp is derived on the presumption that 
everything produced will be sold. This presumption is also true if
c p p = , where 
c p  clears the 
market,  () ()
cc Dp Sp = , where  () Dpdenotes demand at p. But it is not true if
c p p > . 
Producers with a “disequilibrium awareness” (Fisher 1983) should realize this and adjust 
production accordingly – assuming that they do take the market price p as given when 
production is determined. 
  At this stage market sharing has to be specified. Assuming (for simplicity) homogeneous 
goods, market shares can only be influenced by making goods easily available to consumers 
in shops. And assuming that availability in shops is proportional to output distributed among 
shops in the market, a firm’s market share will be 
(6)   ii j qq α = ∑ , 
where i q denotes a firm’s production. This is proportional rationing, where every unit of 
supply of a homogeneous good has the same probability of being sold in the market. 
   It follows that a firm’s profit function is   
(7)   ( ) () ii j i i pD p q q c q π =− ∑ , 
where  () i c ⋅  denotes a firm’s cost function, assuming in addition (for simplicity) that output 
remaining at the end of the market period is without value.
2 Differentiation yields 








∂ ′ =− −
∂
, 
where  () j dD p q = ∑ . It follows that ( ) i q is an equilibrium point if  
(9)   () ( ) 1 ii i pd c q α ′ −=  for every i. 
                                                 
1 This subsection is a revised version of ch. 4 in my thesis (Farm 1986). 
2 Also note that stocks remaining at the end of the market period are often sold at a reduced price (or simply 
scrapped). In any case, adding an inventory evaluation function will not change the substance of the analysis.       6
This system of equations cannot in general be solved without information on individual cost 
functions.  But in atomistic industries, where firms are “small”, we can set  0 i α = ,  so that 
() ii pd c q ′ = or, equivalently,  () ii qs p d = . Hence  ( ) i qS p d = ∑  and  () ( ) dD pS p d = so 
that  () dd p =  solves the equation 
(10)  ( ) ( ) Dp Sp dd = . 
Assuming, as we always do in this paper, that  ( ) Dpis decreasing in p and  () Sp increasing 
or constant, the solution to this equation is unique, and then we have the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. In a market where production precedes sales and rationing is proportional, 
“small” firms taking a market price 
c p p >   as given will in equilibrium produce  
(11)  ( ) ( ) ( )
e
ii qp sp d p = , 
where  () dpis defined above. 
 
Note that  ()1 dp<  for 
c p p >  so that (11) is indeed an interior solution (excluding market 
clearing) and  () 1 dp − is the equilibrium rate of excess supply. 
  Also note that ( )( ) () ( ) pD p S pd p pd p = , so that, with our assumptions on demand and 
supply, it follows from () () () () () pD S pd pd pd S pd pd ′′ ′ ′ =+  that   
(12)  () () () () sign pd p sign pD p ′ ′ = . 
Hence the equilibrium supply curve 
(13)  ( ) ( ) ( )
ee QQ pS p d p ==  
is backward-bending at p  if the usual potential supply curve  ( ) Sp is forward-bending  and 
demand is elastic,  () () ( ) 1 pD p D p p η ′ −= > , since () ( ) 1 pD D η ′ = − . If demand is elastic 
for every
c p p > , equilibrium supply will be less than  ( )
c Dp  for every
c p p > . And if 
demand is inelastic at
c p , equilibrium supply will be increasing up to  () argmax
o p pD p =  
and then decreasing.   7
  The traditional supply curve  () Sp reflects potential output from every potential firm. The 
equilibrium supply curve  ()
e Qp reflects endogenous output restriction, including exit. A 
firm’s output will be positive if and only if ( ) ( ) 0 i sp dp> . 
  Next we find that every firm prefers the same market price, irrespective of its cost 
function: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. In a market where production precedes sales, rationing is proportional and 
firms are “small”, all firms prefer the same market price, namely  
(14)  ( ) max ,
co p p ,  
(15) where  () ( )
cc Dp Sp = and ( ) argmax
o p pD p = . 
Proof. Recall that a firm’s profits in equilibrium after quantity adjustment are 
(16)  () ( ) ( )
ee e
ii i i p pd p q c q π =− , 
where  () dpis defined above and  ( ) ( )
e
ii qs p d p = maximizes  ( )( ) ii i i pdp q cq π =− . It 
follows from the envelope theorem that 











and hence that  ()
e
i p π  is maximized by  ( ) argmax pdp , which is equal to () argmax pDp 
according to (12) .   
 
The intuition of this result is a follows. A firm with a disequilibrium awareness should realize 
that its profits for 
c p p >  will not be  ( ) ii i pqc q −  but ( ) ( ) ii i pdp q cq − , where 
() pdpdenotes average revenues per unit of supply (in equilibrium after quantity adjustment). 
Moreover, assuming that the firm is too small to perceive any influence from  i q  on () pdp, it 
quite naturally wishes to maximize average revenues per unit of supply, irrespective of its 
output and cost function. And maximization of  ( ) pdpturns out to be equivalent to 
maximization of the industry’s collective sales revenues ( ) pDp. 
  Finally, to complete the model it is hardly realistic in this case to assume that one of the 
small firms is a price leader. Instead we assume, in order to model an orderly market, that the 
industry has a trade association which sets the market price. And realizing that every firm   8
prefers that market price which maximizes the industry’s revenues, the trade association’s 
problem is that of a statistician, namely to estimate the demand function and especially its 
elasticity. 
 
3.2 Price formation in oligopolistic markets
3 
The result that every firm prefers the same market price, irrespective of its cost function, is 
remarkable and can probably not be generalized from an atomistic to an oligopolistic market 
when production precedes sales (and it is definitely not true when sales precede production, as 
we shall see in the next section). But let us now see what can be generalized in the simplest 
possible framework. Assuming identical firms and constant returns it is also possible to 
provide explicit formulas for excess supply and profits in equilibrium.  
 
PROPOSITION 3. Consider a market where production precedes sales, rationing is 
proportional and there are n firms producing at constant returns with the same marginal cost c 
at a market price p c ≥ . Then each firm in equilibrium produces:  







=  if 
u p p > ,  
(19)  () ( )
e
ii qp D p α =  if 
u cpp ≤ ≤ ,  
(20) where  ( ) 11
u p cn =−,  ( )
u dp p p = , and 
(21)  1 ii cp α ε =− + , where  0 i ε ≥  and  ( ) 11 j nc p ε =− − ∑ . 
Proof.  In this case (9) reduces to the system of equations ( ) 1 i p dc α − = , which is solved by 
1 i n α =  and  () () 11 dc p n =−  if  1 d < or, equivalently, 
u p p > . And then we also have 
() ( )
ee
j qQD p d p == ∑ and 
ee
i qQ n = . Next we observe that a point on the demand curve 
(where  1 d = ) will be an equilibrium point if   ( ) 10 ii i qp c πα ∂ ∂= − −≤ for every i. And this 
condition is satisfied for the market shares specified above if 
u cpp ≤ ≤ . 
 
The assumption of constant returns should not be taken literally. Instead it models a situation 
when demand is so low that capacity constraints can be ignored. In general, potential 
aggregate supply is of course not equal to infinity but some total capacity K if  p c > . 
                                                 
3 This subsection is a summary of Farm (1988).   9
Moreover, potential aggregate supply is indeterminate – between  ( ) Dcand K – if  p c = . On 
the other hand, we now see that firms taking the market price as given will restrict production 
so that actual aggregate supply is always determinate and limited. In fact the market even 
clears if 
u cpp ≤≤ . But the market shares are not uniquely determined in this case (unless 
u p p = ) . They are completely indeterminate if  p c = , since then  ii α ε =  and  1 j ε = ∑ . 
However, at market prices between c and 
u p  all market shares will be at least as great as 
1 cp − , and they “tend towards uniqueness” (in fact towards  1 i n α = ) as 
u p p → . And if 
u p p >  there will be excess supply in equilibrium. In fact firms will produce 
(22)  ()() ( ) ( ) 11
e
j qp np c D p =− ∑  if  ( ) 11
u p pc n >= − .  
 
PROPOSITION 4. Consider a market where production precedes sales, rationing is 
proportional and there are n firms producing at constant returns with the same marginal cost c. 
Then all firms prefer the same market price, namely 
(23) 
o p  if 
ou p p > ,   
(24)  ( ) min ,
um p p  if 
ou p p ≤ , 
(25) where  () argmax
o p pD p = ,  ( ) 11
u p cn =− and  ( )( ) argmax
m p pc D p =− . 
Proof.  It follows from  () ii pdc q π =− and Proposition 3 that in equilibrium after quantity 
adjustment at the market price p, 
(26)  () ( )
2 e
i p pD p n π =  if 
u p p ≥  , 
(27)  () ( ) ( )
e
ii p pc D p πα =−  if 
u p p ≤ . 
As noted in Proposition 3, the market shares  i α  are not completely determinate in our model 
if 
u p p ≤ . Since they are equal for
u p p > , we assume, however, that they are equal,  1 i n α = , 
for 
u p p ≤  as well. And then the proposition follows immediately from the expressions above 
for a firm’s profits, since () ( ) p cDp − is increasing in p up to 
m p  and 
om p p < with our 
assumptions on demand. 
 
Substituting () () 11
mm pc p η =− and  ( ) 1
u pc n n = − in 
mu p p <  we also find that 
() min ,
um m p pp =  if and only if  ( )
m np η < . Excluding exceptional cases with elastic   10
demand and few firms, however, all firms prefer  ( ) max ,
uo p p as the market price, where 
u p  
clears the market, just as 
c p  does in Proposition 2. (But note that 
u p c > , even if 
u p c →  as 
n →∞.) Thus, the essence of Proposition 2 also applies to oligopolistic industries with 
identical firms (when capacity constraints can be ignored). And note that an oligopolist’s 
price preference is independent of the number of firms when demand is sufficiently inelastic. 
  Moreover, when demand is inelastic it should be possible for producers to exploit this 
when consumers are price-takers and price-setting is up to the producers. But instead of 
postulating a statistician, as in an atomistic market, it may be more reasonable here to 
complete the model by postulating a price leader. And when all firms prefer the same market 
price, the choice of price leader is immaterial. 
  Note, however, that a revenue-maximizing market price comes at a cost, namely costly 
competition for market shares through non-cooperatively chosen quantities, taking the market 
price as given. In fact it follows from  ( ) ( ) ii pdp c q π =−  and Proposition 3 that 








π =   , 
so that total profits in the industry will tend towards 0 as n →∞. A corollary of this result is 
that new entrants would reduce profits for incumbents not only at the rate of 1 n , because of 
more firms sharing the same revenues, but at the rate of 
2 1 n , because of additional supply in 
equilibrium. 
 
4. Price formation in markets where production precedes sales 
This section deals with markets where sales precede production or, in other words, firms 
produce to order. Carlton (1989 p. 941) expects “that our economy has increased its reliance 
on industries that produce to order”, even if he “has not seen much research on this topic”. 
Since production to orders eliminates costly excess supply, it may also appear profitable for 
all firms in an industry to introduce this market form – whenever it is possible. 
  Services are, of course, always produced to order. Otherwise production to orders is 
possible whenever consumers can accept some waiting time between purchase and delivery. If 
consumers want to inspect a product before purchase, they will prefer shops where products 
are demonstrated, but they may accept some waiting time before a replica of the product is 
delivered from the factory, implying production to orders. And with the advent of internet, not 
even a visit to a shop with inventories may be necessary.   11
  In markets with production to orders, supply is always equal to demand, so the notion of a 
market price determined by market-clearing is meaningless. And then, assuming that market 
shares  i α  are exogenously given, profits of a firm in an industry with identical firms taking a 
market price  p c ≥ as given are ( ) ( ) ii p cDp πα =− , where c denotes marginal cost, so that 
all firms prefer the monopoly price  ( ) ( ) argmax
m p pc D p =− , when all firms are producing 
below capacity in a recession. 
  In general, however, the market price will be ( ) max ,
mk p p , where 
k p  denotes the 
capacity-clearing price, ()
k p PK = , where  ( ) P ⋅ denotes the inverse of the demand function. 
In a boom the market price will consequently be capacity-clearing if demand is so strong 
that
km p p > . In a recession, on the other hand, the market price will be monopolistic with 
respect to variable cost, but it will not be particularly high unless demand is very inelastic. 
Note that a firm’s profits are not even positive unless  ( ) ( )
mm
ii i p cDp r K α −> , where  ii rK  
denotes the firm’s capital costs. 
  Moreover, in a market with homogeneous goods and identical firms the assumption of 
exogenous markets shares is not exceptional, since in this case every firm has the same 
probability of being contacted by a consumer, so the market shares must be equal (according 
to the law of large numbers). And if firms have different capacities i k , it may sometimes be 
reasonable to assume that investment in outlets has been adjusted to capacities, so that 
markets shares are predetermined and thus exogenous during the market period even in this 
case, with  ii j kk α = ∑ . It follows that if we complete the model with a barometric price 
leader, both the market price and the industry’s profits will be the same as with a monopoly. 
  We shall now see how marketing, cost differentials and capacity differentials can modify 
this bench-mark model of price formation in markets with production to orders. 
 
4.1 Effects of marketing 
In markets with production to orders, a firm’s output does not determine but is determined by 
its market share. However, a firm can influence its market share by other means than output. 
Following Shubik with Levitan (1980 p. 192-194), we assume that a firm’s market share is 
(29)  () 1 ii i j aa βγ α γ =− + ∑ , 01 γ < ≤ ,   12
where  i α  denotes its market share in the absence of marketing,  i a denotes the firm’s 
expenditures on marketing and γ  measures the effect of this marketing. 
  Shubik with Levitan (1980 p. 194) interprets  i a  as expenditures on advertising and 1 γ −  
as the proportion of customers who are not influenced by advertising, but other interpretations 
are possible, provided they only include expenditures on marketing which are made and have 
effects during the market period. The market shares  i α  may be equal to 1 n or  ij kk ∑  or, in 
general, determined by previous marketing expenditures, including expenditures on design. 
  With this marketing technology a firm’s profit function is 
(30)  () ( ) ( ) 1 ii i j i p cDp a a a πγ α γ ⎡⎤ =− − + − ⎣⎦ ∑ , 
so that 










∂∂ =− − , 
where  j Aa =∑ . It follows that in equilibrium at  p c > , 
(32)  1 i aA n = , 
(33)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 Ap c D p n γ =− − , 
(34)  () ( ) ( )
2 1 ii p cDp n πγ α γ ⎡ ⎤ =− − + ⎣ ⎦. 
Marketing will consequently affect profits but not preferred prices in equilibrium. 
  However, introducing capacity constraints, and assuming for simplicity that all firms have 
the same size ( i kK n = ) and the same  i α , a firm’s profits as a function of the market price p 
(in marketing equilibrium) will be  
(35)   ()( ) ( ) i p pc D pm π =−  if  ( ) p PK > , 
(36)  ()( ) i p pc K n π =−  if  ( ) p PK ≤ , 
where  () P ⋅  denotes the inverse of the demand function, and 
(37)  ( )
2 11 mn n γγ =− + , 
assuming that marketing when there is excess demand or capacity-clearing ( () p PK ≤ )  can 
be ignored. Note that  () i p π  is discontinuous at  ( ) p PK = , since 11 mn <  when  0 γ >  and 
1 n > .  
   We now have the following result: 
   13
PROPOSITION 5. Consider n firms with the same constant marginal cost c up to capacity and 
the same capacity (Kn ) in a market with production to orders and marketing according to 
(29). Then all firms prefer the same market price, namely 
(38) 
m p  if  d KK > , 
(39)  ( ) PK if  d KK ≤ , 
(40) where  () ( ) argmax
m p pc D p =−  and  d K is determined by the equation 
(41)  () ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1
mm
dd PK cK n p cDp γγ −= − + − . 
 
Proof. Follows immediately from (35) and (36), since ( ) ( ) p cDp − is increasing in p up to 
m p  with our assumptions on demand. 
 
 
Note that, in this case, a price leader will set a capacity-clearing price  ( ) PK not only for 
()
m KD p ≤ , as in a price leader model with exogenous market shares. Instead we have 
capacity clearing and a market price below 
m p  all the way up to d K , with  d K  even 
approaching  () Dcas n →∞ if  1 γ = . The threat of costly competition for market shares in 
excess-capacity situations will enforce capacity clearing provided that d KK ≤ , so that the 
profit guarantee at capacity clearing is sufficiently high. 
 
4.2 Effects of different costs 
Let us now ignore marketing as well as capacity constraints and focus on costs. Suppose there 
are ν  low-cost firms in the market with the same marginal cost ( 1 c ), and let  1
m p  maximize 
() ( ) 1 p cDp − . Taking the market price as given by  1
m p , it will be tempting for a high-cost 
firm (  n c ) to enter the market, provided that  1
m
n cp < .  But the market share and the profits of 
the price leader (one of the low-cost producers) will decline as high-cost firms enter the 
market. Assuming in addition (for simplicity) that each firm captures an equal share of the 
market, a low-cost firm will prefer  n c instead of  1
m p  as the market price if 
(42)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1
mm
nn cc D c pc D p n ν −> − , 
i.e., if the number of firms (n) is so large that the profits at a low price ( n c ) and a big market 
share (1ν ) is higher than the profits at a high price ( 1
m p ) and a small market share (1 n).    14
 
PROPOSITION 6. Consider ν  low-cost firms ( 1 c ) and n ν −  high-cost firms ( n c ) in a market 
with production to orders and constant returns, and suppose that  1
m
n cp <  where 
() ( ) 11 argmax
m p pcD p =− .  Then all low-cost firms prefer the same market price, namely 
(43)  1
m p  if  ns cc ≤ , 
(44)  n c  if  ns cc > , 
where  s c  is defined by 
(45)  () ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 11 1 1
mm
ss cc D c np c D p ν −= − . 
Proof. Follows immediately from (42), since ( ) ( ) 1 p cDp − is increasing in p up to  1
m p  with 
our assumptions on demand. 
 
Thus, threat of entry of high-cost firms will force low-cost firms to marginal cost pricing with 
respect to the high cost if the high cost is not too low,  ns cc > . Note that here the price leader 
cuts its price in order to eliminate high-cost competitors (“cut-throat” competition). In the 
next subsection, with decreasing returns, a price leader may find a price-cut profitable even if 
it does not eliminate other firms.  
  
 
4.3 Effects of different capacities 
Consider an industry with ν  small firms (with capacity  1 k ) and n ν −  big firms (with capacity 
1 n kk > ), where every firm has the same (constant) marginal cost ( i cc = ) up to its (fixed) 
capacity. We assume that each firm has the same market share at the market price p when no 
capacity constraint is binding, i.e. when ( ) 1 Dp n k ≤ or, equivalently, when  () 1 p Pn k ≥ , 
where  () P ⋅  denotes the inverse of the demand function. For lower price levels the small firms 
will produce at capacity and rationed customers will turn to other firms. 
  The profits of a small firm as a function of the market price p will consequently be 
(46)  ()( ) ( ) 1 p pc D pn π =−  if 
u p p ≥ , 
(47)  ()( ) 11 p pc k π =−  if 
u p p ≤ , 
(48) where  ( ) 1
u p Pn k = , 
while the profits of a big firm as a function of the market price p will be   15
(49)  ()( ) ( ) n p pc D pn π =−  if 
u p p ≥ , 
(50)  ()( ) ( ) ( ) nn p pc p D p πα =−  if 
ku p pp ≤ ≤ , 
(51)  ()( ) nn p pc k π =−  if 
k p p ≤ , 











 and  ( ) ( ) 1
k
n p Pk n k νν =+ − .    
  It follows immediately that a small firm will never prefer a lower market price than a big 
firm, and that the market price preferred by a small firm is 
(53)  ( ) ( )
*
11 argmax max ,
mu p pp p π == , 
(54) where  ( ) ( ) argmax
m p pc D p =− . 
  The market price preferred by a big firm depends on the size of a small firm, and we shall 
here focus on the case when  () 1
m kD pn ≥  or, equivalently, 
um p p ≤ , when small firms 
always prefer the monopoly price 
m p  (while results for  ( ) 1
m kD pn < are reported in 
Appendix 2). In this case the “monopolistic option”, 
(55)  () ( ) ( )
mm m
n p pc D pn π =− , 
is always available to a big firm. But note that  ( ) n p α is decreasing in p, so that a lower 
market price will increase the market share of a big firm, and sometimes also, as we shall see 
below, its profits. 
   To derive that price which maximizes  ( ) n p π  we begin by noting that 













ku p pp ≤ ≤ , 






=  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) p pD p D p η ′ =− . 
Note that  () p ϕ is increasing in p, with  ( ) 0 c ϕ =  and  ( ) 1
m p ϕ = . Our assumptions on demand 
imply that  () n p π′  is decreasing in p. Hence, whenever there is an interior maximum on 
ku p pp ≤≤ , it is defined implicitly by the equation  ( ) ( ) ( )
oo
n p np ϕν α =− , or, equivalently, 
by the equation 
(58)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
oo Dp p k ϕ ν −= . 
Note that 
o p  is less than
m p , independent of  n k  and decreasing in 1 k . And assuming a linear 














PROPOSITION 7. Consider ν  small firms (with capacity 1 k ) and n ν − big firms (with 
capacity  1 n kk > ) producing at constant marginal cost (c) in a market with production to orders. 
Suppose that  () 1
m kD pn ≥  so that all small firms prefer monopoly pricing. Then all big 
firms prefer the same market price, namely 
(60) 
m p  if 
*
11 kk ≥ , 
(61) 
m p  if 
*
11 kk ≤  and  1
r
nn kkk ≤ ≤ , 
(62) 
k p  if 
*
11 kk ≤  and 
* r
nnn kkk ≤ ≤ , 
(63) 
o p  if 
*
11 kk ≤  and 
*
nn kk ≥ , 
where  () ( ) argmax
m p pc D p =− ,  ( ) ( ) 1
k
n p Pk n k νν =+ − , 
o p is defined above and the 
critical capacities 
*
1 k , 
*
n k  and 
r
n k  are defined in Appendix 2. 
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
 
According to Scherer (1980 p. 176), collusive price leadership is most likely to emerge when, 
among other things, “the oligopolists’ cost curves are similar”. But how “similar” must the 
cost curves be? Proposition 7 suggests an answer, since every firm prefers 
m p  as market price 
if the firms’ capacities are “sufficiently large” (
*
11 kk ≥ ) or “sufficiently similar” ( 1
r
nn kkk ≤≤). 
  On the other hand, Chamberlin (1929 p. 86) envisages a disintegration of monopoly 
pricing in an oligopolistic market when the number of firms increases, even if he finds it 
“impossible to say at just what point” this will happen. But Proposition 7 suggests an answer, 
provided that we can assume that an increasing number of firms also makes “dissimilar” firms 
more probable. A necessary condition for the breaking up of monopolistic pricing is that some 
firms are “sufficiently small”, or more precisely that 
*
11 kk ≤ . Moreover, given the presence of 
such small firms, monopoly pricing will break up if (and only if) some firms become 
“sufficiently big”, or more precisely if 
r
nn kk > . For then all big firms prefer a market price 
below
m p . And with one of the big firms as a price leader this preferred price will also be the 
market price.    17
  It might be argued, however, that price leadership is not a robust market form in this case. 
In fact it can be shown that small firms will prefer to stick to
m p  in some cases, even if the big 
firms set
k p or 
o p . However, this will either not affect the profits of big firms (if 
* k
n p p = , 
where 
*
n p  is the market price preferred by a big firm) or increase them (if 
* o
n p p = ), since 
()
** *
1 () nn n n n p pp pc k π >=− whenever it is possible for small firms to raise profits by 
exploiting a contingent demand curve. This might be an explanation of price dispersion in 
some cases, but I will not pursue this issue any further in this paper. 
  Now, what kind of pricing will obtain when monopoly pricing has broken up? A capacity-
clearing price is a particularly interesting candidate, representing, as it does, the classical 
notion of an equilibrium price determined by equality between demand and (potential) supply. 
And a competitive price leader does find 
k p profit-maximizing in some circumstances, 
namely if the small firms are “sufficiently small” (
*
11 kk ≤ ) and the big firms are both 
“sufficiently large” (
r
nn kk ≥ ) and “sufficiently small” (
*
nn kk ≤ ). 
  If, however, the big firms are “sufficiently large” (
*
nn kk ≥ ), while the small firms still are 
“sufficiently small” (
*
11 kk ≤ ), a big firm will prefer a market price 
o p  at which small firms 
produce at capacity but big firms produce below capacity and consequently maximize profits 
with respect to the residual demand curve. This suggests dominant-firm price leadership, as 
defined, for instance, in Scherer (1980 p. 176), since this market form is characterized by the 
following assumptions, assuming, for simplicity, that there is only one big firm. 
  Firstly, the market price is set by the big firm, while the small firms (the “competitive 
fringe”) take the price as given. Secondly, the small firms produce “competitively” at the 
given price, i.e. at full capacity. Thirdly, the big firm sets that price which maximizes its 
individual profits, given its residual demand curve. And a central prediction of the dominant 
firm theory is that the price set by the dominant firm is decreasing in the total capacity of the 
small firms, including marginal cost pricing as a special case. 
  Proposition 7 suggests a rationale for dominant-firm price leadership – as well as 
boundaries for its applicability. A big firm will indeed anticipate the supply reactions of other 
firms, or, more precisely, their market shares at different market prices. In doing this, the big 
firm will also find it optimal, in some circumstances, to set a price at which the small firms 
produce all they want at the ruling market price. And then the market price is indeed 
decreasing in the total capacity of the small firms, according to (59).  But note that 
o p  only   18
applies as long as 
*
11 kk ≤ . This means that there is a lower limit (above marginal cost) to the 
price set by a dominant firm, in contrast to traditional dominant firm analysis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The most important predictions of competitive price leadership are, in summary, as follows. 
First, the basic determinants of the market price are the relation between demand and capacity 
in the industry and the price elasticity of demand. If demand is sufficiently strong in relation 
to capacity (so that 
km p p > ), a price leader will set the capacity-clearing price, and variations 
in demand will affect price but not production. With excess capacity, on the other hand, there 
will be mark-up pricing, with a mark-up over variable costs which depends on the price 
elasticity of demand. 
  Second, the market price set by a competitive price leader depends on whether production 
precedes sales or not. In markets where production precedes sales, the market price will 
maximize the industry’s sales revenues. 
  Third, in markets where sales precede production, pricing will be monopolistic if the 
firms’ cost curves are “sufficiently similar” or their capacities “sufficiently large” (as 
specified more precisely in Section 4). But a monopolistic price in this context means 
monopolistic with respect to variable cost, so that fixed costs are not covered and profits are 
not positive unless demand is sufficiently inelastic. 
  Fourth, the market price set by a competitive price leader may be reduced by the presence 
of firms with high costs or low capacities, since this will make it possible for the price leader, 
in some circumstances, to increase its market share and also its profits by reducing its price. 
And the threat of costly competition for market shares may reduce the market price even for 
identical firms. 
  Fifth, a fall in demand during a recession need not reduce the market price. Sales are 
reduced but not necessarily the market price. And if the market price responds at all, it 
increases if it before the recession was lower than the monopoly price, since excess capacity 
is conducive to monopolistic pricing (as we have seen in Section 4), while it decreases only if 
it before the recession was higher than the monopoly price. 
  Sixth, the market price depends on the number of firms only in special cases. The 
breaking up of a monopoly, for instance, does not necessarily lower the market price. But it 
leads to competition in other variables than prices, which may increase availability and   19
quality of the products. Deregulation of a taxi market, for example, will not lower the market 
price but increase the number of cabs. 
  Seventh, at the market price set by a competitive price leader there will be excess supply 
in markets where production precedes sales, even in equilibrium, when firms have realized 
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Appendix 1. Notes on the literature 
 
Suppose that firms choose quantities ( i q ) as well as prices ( i p ) non-cooperatively. It is 
sometimes taken for granted that excess capacity is sufficient to guarantee a competitive 
equilibrium even in this case (see e.g. Levitan and Shubik 1980 p. 66). But a competitive state 
which clears the market can never be a non-cooperative equilibrium in a price-quantity game 
in which the strategy of each player consists of two numbers, namely a price ( i p ) at which he 
will sell his product and a quantity ( i q ) which he will bring to the market place. 
  To prove this, let us take () , j cq as given for  j i ≠  and contemplate strategies 
() ( ) ,, ii i p xc q ≠  for firm i. Then consumers will buy  ( ) i Dc q −  (but no more) from the other   22
firms at price c and the contingent demand  i x  from firm i at price  i p c ≥ . And with 
() () i i ii ii p xp c xp π =− we always have  ( ) iii i p xc q π ∂ ∂= =  at  i p c = . And  0 i q >  for at least 
some i, since ( ) i qD c = ∑ . 
 
Static Bertrand models 
Assuming production to orders (preventing production from being a firm’s decision variable), 
firms cannot select their own prices ( i p ) non-cooperatively without being forced to marginal 
cost pricing. The well-known argument, assuming equal and constant marginal cost (c), is that 
i p pc =>  cannot define an equilibrium since every firm can increase its sales discontinuous-
ly by choosing a price slightly less than p. More precisely,  i p p =  is not optimal against 
j p p =  ( j i ≠ ) for any  p c > , while  i p c =  is optimal against  j p c = ( j i ≠ ) for every i. 
  One assumption upon which this argument is based is also well-known, viz. the existence 
of excess capacity. For if capacities ( i k ) were limited in the sense that a firm’s rivals could 
not satisfy the whole market ( ( ) j ji kD c
≠ < ∑  where  ( ) Dp denotes the market demand 
function), a firm’s sales would not reduce to zero for  i p c > , given  j p c =  ( j i ≠ ). In this 
case the market price is indeterminate, as emphasized, for instance, by Edgeworth (1925 p. 
125), Shubik (1959 ch. 5) and Shapley and Shubik (1969). A Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies does not exist. 
    Equilibria in mixed strategies may exist (Dasgupta and Maskin 1986), and some 
characterizations are also available in the literature. In situations with binding capacity 
constraints, the monopoly price is quoted with positive probability not only in a duopoly 
(Davidson and Deneckere 1986, Osborne and Pitchik 1986), but also in an industry with many 
firms (Allen and Hellwig 1986). At the same time prices converge in a probabilistic sense 
(more precisely in distribution) to the market-clearing price, when the number of firms 
increases (Allen and Hellwig 1986). 
  Mixed strategy solutions to oligopoly problems are also presented by e.g. Shubik (1959 ch. 
5) and Levitan and Shubik (1980 ch. 8). But they do this with many reservations, and the use 
of mixed strategies is also much harder to justify in non-constant-sum games (where they may 
lead to unstable equilibria) than in constant-sum games (see Shubik 1982 p. 249-251). And, as 
noted by Shapiro (1989 p. 346), each firm in a mixed equilibrium “would have an incentive to 
change its ex ante optimal but ex post suboptimal price”.    23
  The paper by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) shows what happens if the auctioneer in a 
Cournot model is replaced by Bertrand pricing, but also what happens in a Bertrand model if 
the assumption of production to orders is replaced by production before sales. An important 
conclusion is that outcomes are sensitive not only to the way the price-setting stage is 
specified, but also to the relation in time between production and pricing. Moreover, 
outcomes are sensitive to how demand is rationed by a firm with a low price, as demonstrated 
by Davidson and Deneckere (1986). 
 
Dynamic Bertrand models 
Repetition of a Bertrand game will sometimes neutralize its competitive implications. The 
basic idea is that the long-run loss of a price war will outweigh the short-run gain of a price 
cut if the discount factor is sufficiently high. Assuming n identical firms and constant returns, 
pricing will be monopolistic if  () 11 n δ −≤  and competitive if   ( ) 11 n δ − > , where δ is the 
discount factor; see, for instance, Shapiro (1989 p. 370). 
  Introducing capacity constraints, the degree of sustainable collusion is studied by Brock 
and Scheinkman (1985) in a model with identical firms. They find that an increase of the 
number of firms sometimes will raise the cartel price (if total capacity is larger than monopoly 
capacity but not “too large”). Benoit and Krishna (1987) study capacity choice with repeated 
price competition in a duopoly, focusing on the possibility of excess capacity in equilibrium. 
Some results on pricing by two firms with different capacities are also available in Davidson 
and Deneckere (1990, Section 4). Assuming that prices are chosen, subject to “no cheating”, 
so as to maximize a certain “cartel welfare function”  ( ) 12 , F π π , where  i π  denotes the profits 
of firm i and  1 0 F > and  2 0 F > , they find that pricing will be monopolistic if the interest rate 
is sufficiently low.  
  Models of “alternating price competition”, originating with Maskin and Tirole (1988), do 
not represent repeated sealed bidding, but like sealed bidding they start from the concept of 
“commitment”. Thus price-setters are committed to their prices for at least some time. This 
means that a price cut will always raise a firm’s market share and its profits, even if it only is 
for a very short time, until competitors have retaliated. In this set-up a firm will abstain from 
price-cutting if – and only if – its long-run loss (due to a price-war) will outweigh its short-run 
gain. 
 
   24
Quick response models 
A repeated game has not been the only attempt to model the seminal idea in Chamberlin 
(1929) that threats to match price cuts will prevent price cuts. An alternative is the “quick 
response” approach, which postulates a period of price adjustment before trade takes place. 
During this period initial price announcements are observed and reacted upon 
“instantaneously”, and all transitory profits, which the firms might earn before the responses 
are complete, are assumed to be negligible.   
  The intuition of the quick response approach is straightforward, assuming that firms are 
free to observe and change their prices at any time with negligible costs (perfect price 
flexibility). Contemplating a price cut a firm must reckon with responses evoked by it. In 
equilibrium a firm’s pricing strategy must consequently be optimal against other firms’ 
complete pricing strategies, including not only their expected initial prices but also their 
expected price response functions. Moreover, in a non-cooperative equilibrium such 
expectations must be rational, as emphasized not least by Johansen (1982) and Friedman 
(1983), including, in particular, rational expectations of rivals’ response functions. 
   Suppose that every firm quotes the monopoly price to begin with. Then a price cut might 
appear profitable to an individual firm, but only if other firms do not match the cut. Now, if 
other firms do not match a price cut, “almost every” firm will quote the monopoly price, and 
the rest will quote a price only slightly less. On the other hand, if other firms do match a price 
cut, an individual firm cannot rationally go on believing that rivals will not match price cuts. 
If price cutting occurs, its function is not to enforce a competitive price but rational 
expectations of rivals’ price response functions. And having succeeded in doing this, price 
cutting expires. In fact a rather heroic degree of myopia is required to insist on taking rivals’ 
prices as given when they are constantly falling. We conclude that price cutting is impossible 
as a part of equilibrium behaviour, as emphasized, for instance, by Friedman (1983 p. 228). 
  For this argument to hold it is only necessary that price cutting by a firm can be detected 
by other firms. This assumption may not be valid with large buyers (cf. Stigler 1964), but in 
markets with small buyers – as in consumer markets – it is certainly applicable, since “no one 
has yet invented a way to advertise price reductions which brings them to the attention of 
numerous customers but not to that of any rival” (Stigler 1964).  
  In consumer markets, where buyers take prices as given and firms are free to observe and 
revise their prices at any time, it is also reasonable to assume that a firm can – if it so wishes – 
set the same price as another firm. Also note that price-taking behaviour and price leadership   25
“is not apt to be found contrary to the antitrust laws unless the leader attempts to coerce other 
producers into following its lead” (Scherer 1980 p. 520). 
  Formal models of the quick-response approach include Marschak and Selten (1978), Farm 
and Weibull (1987) and Bhaskar (1989). Bhaskar (1989) assumes that price decisions  i p  are 
taken at time t, and set equal to the price announcement at time t, ( ) ii p pt = , if and only if, for 
every j,  () ( ) 1 jj pt pt =− . Price announcements are consequently not perceived as final price 
decisions (trading prices) until, after having been observed, they are repeated by every firm. 
(If there is no repetition for a finite t, Bhaskar assumes that no trade takes place.) 
  We interpret repetition as acceptance. Every firm can veto or “vote against” the current 
price vector merely by changing its own price. On the other hand, a firm accepts or “votes 
for” the current price vector by not changing its own price. Price announcements become 
price decisions when accepted by every firm in this sense. Moreover, since no firm is 
committed to its initial price announcement, it is not restrictive to assume that ()
* 0 ii p p = , 
where 
*
i p  denotes the market price preferred by firm i.   
  Consider for simplicity a duopoly and define price-taking behaviour for firm i by the 
pricing strategy () ( ) 1 ij p tp t += ,  0,1,... t =  .Then it is easy to see, when the firms prefer the 
same price, 
***
12 p pp ==, that price-taking strategies (with preferred prices as initial price 
announcements) constitute a Nash equilibrium with 
*
i p p = as final price decisions. 
  On the other hand, if firms can agree on playing a non-cooperative game with rules as 
specified above, they should also be able to agree on price leadership. 
 
Price leadership 
Price leadership is not even mentioned in the index to the Handbook of Industrial 
Organization (Schmalensee and Willig 1989, Armstrong and Porter 2007), while it is 
frequently discussed in traditional literature, including Scherer (1980). In the traditional 
literature price leadership means that one of the firms sets a price which the other firms match. 
This is also the definition I use in this paper – but note, for instance, the difference between 
my analysis of dominant-firm price leadership (in Section 4.3) and the traditional one.  
  In modern (strictly non-cooperative) literature, however, there is also another 
interpretation of price leadership, namely that the followers optimize against the price set by 
the leader (Stackelberg leadership). Of course this means marginal cost pricing when the 
followers have sufficient capacity. But it also means that a pure strategy equilibrium exists   26
when capacity constraints prevent marginal cost pricing.  The basic idea, as noted for instance 
by Shubik with Levitan (1980 p. 143) for a duopoly, is that the leader will set the highest 
price which makes it more profitable for the follower to set a high price (exploiting contingent 
demand) than to undercut. Shubik with Levitan add, however, that “(w)hile these solutions 
may be formally correct under static conditions, they are highly unrealistic”. 
  Which firm will be the leader in a Stackelberg game? Hviid (1990) considers a pricing 
game where two firms sequentially decide whether or not they want to commit to a price and 
become a Stackelberg leader. When capacities differ the big firm is indifferent between being 
a leader and a follower, while the small firm prefers being a follower, suggesting that the big 
firm becomes the leader (at least when discounting is introduced). 
   Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) investigate three potential price setting games in a 
duopoly with one big firm and one small firm, namely a Bertrand game, a Stackelberg game 
with the big firm as a leader, and a Stackelberg game with the small firm as a leader. Letting 
S
i π  denote the payoff to firm i in the simultaneous move game, 
L
i π  the payoff to firm i as a 
leader and 
F
i π  the payoff to firm i as a follower in a Stackelberg game, they find that 
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SLF π ππ =<, provided that the firms’ capacities  1 k and  21 kk >  are in the 
range where the simultaneous move game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In this case 
firm 2 (the big firm) is consequently indifferent as to which game it plays, while firm 1 (the 
small firm) is indifferent between being a leader and moving simultaneously, but strictly 
prefers to be a follower. It is easy to conclude from this result that the large firm will become 
a leader in a model where leadership is endogenized. As emphasized by Deneckere and 
Kovenock (1992, Section 6), however, the firms’ ranking of the games depends on the 
specification of contingent demand. 
 
Monopolistic competition  
Another common approach in the price-setting literature is based on firms’ individual demand 
functions, usually attributed to heterogeneity (Chamberlin 1962), disequilibrium (Arrow 
1959) or uncertainty (Diamond 1971). The concept is often introduced in unorthodox and 
highly simplified models, as in the seminal paper by Hotelling (1929). But the concept can 
also be defined in a classical homogeneous market: taking his competitors’ prices as given, an 
oligopolist’s contingent demand function (conditional on these prices) is well-defined (Shubik 
1959).   27
  On the other hand, the derivation of individual (contingent) demand curves is a complex 
problem (Shubik 1959 ch. 5). Moreover, as also emphasized by Shubik, imperfections like 
product differentiation only adds to this complexity. The prevalence of subjectively defined 
“perceived” or “conjectured” individual demand curves in the literature following Chamberlin 
(1962), and including Negishi (1960-61, 1979) and Hahn (1978), is therefore not surprising. 
In general firms can only guess at their individual demand curves. 
  With a game-theoretic approach even more information is required. Note, for example, 
that oligopolistic pricing in models with differentiated products, as in Friedman (1983 ch. 3), 
presupposes not only that every producer has perfect information about his own individual 
demand curve, where other prices appear only as parameters (equal to their equilibrium 
values), but also that every producer has perfect information on every firm’s individual 
demand as an explicit function of every firm’s price. 
 
 
Appendix 2. Proofs 
Consider an industry with ν  small firms (with capacity  1 k ) and n ν −  big firms (with capacity 
n k ), where every firm has the same (constant) marginal cost ( i cc = ) up to its (fixed) capacity.  
Then the profits of a big firm as a function of the market price p is 
   ()( ) ( ) n p pc D pn π =−  if 
u p p ≥ , 
   ()( ) ( ) ( ) nn p pc p D p πα =−  if 
ku p pp ≤ ≤ , 
   ()( ) nn p pc k π =−  if 
k p p ≤ , 
   where  () 1
u p Pn k = ,  ( ) ( ) 1
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We wish to find  () argmax n p π  and begin by noting that 













ku p pp ≤ ≤ , 






=  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) p pD p D p η ′ =− . 
Note that  () p ϕ is increasing in p, with  ( ) 0 c ϕ =  and  ( ) 1
m p ϕ = . Our assumptions on demand 
imply that  () n p π′  is decreasing in p. Hence, whenever there is an interior maximum on   28
ku p pp ≤≤ , it is defined implicitly by the equation  ( ) ( ) ( )
oo
n p np ϕν α =− , or, equivalently, 
by the equation 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
oo Dp p k ϕ ν −= . 
Note that 
o p  is less than
m p , independent of  n k  and decreasing in 1 k . 
 
LEMMA 1. Let  p   denote  ( ) argmax n p π for 
ku p pp ≤ ≤ . Then 
  
u p p =  if  ( ) 1
b kD pn ≥ , 
  
k p p =  if  ( ) 1
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*
1 nn kkk ≤ ≤ , 
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where 
b p  and 
*
n k  are defined by the equations 
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Moreover,  () ()
k
nn p k π is increasing in  n k  for 
*
1 nn kkk ≤ ≤  with  ( ) ( ) ()
* ko
nn n p kp ππ = , while 
() () 1
o
n p k π is decreasing in  1 k , with  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
om m m
n p Dp n p cDp n π >−  and 
() () () ( )( )
ob m m
n p Dp n p cDp n π <− . 
Proof. Since  () n p π′  is decreasing in p, 
u p p =   if  ( ) 0
u
n p π′ ≥ , i.e. if  () 1
u np νϕ −≥ or 
ub p p ≤  or  () 1
b nk D p ≥ . Next, suppose that  ( ) 1
b kD pn ≤  or, equivalently,  () 0
u
n p π′ ≤ . 
Then 
k p p =   if  () 0
k
n p π′ ≤  while 
o p p =   if  ( ) 0
k
n p π′ ≥ . And  ( ) 0
k
n p π′ ≤  if and only if 
() ()
k
n nk K p νϕ −≤ , where  ( ) 1 n Kkn k νν =+ − . Note that 
















is an increasing function of  n k  with  ( ) 1 1 f kn ν =− . Moreover,    
   () () ( ) ( ) () 1
k
nn p Pk n k g k ϕϕ ν ν =+ − =    29
is a decreasing function of  n k  with  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 gk Pn k ϕ = . It follows that  () n f k  and  () n gk  
have a unique intersection for  1 n kk ≥  if and only if  ( ) ( ) 1 1 nP n k νϕ −≤ , which is equivalent 
to  () 1
b Pn k p ≥ or  () 1
b nk D p ≤ . And then  ( ) ( ) nn f kg k ≤  if and only if 
*
nn kk ≤ , where 
() ()
**
nn f kg k = . It follows that 
k p p =   if and only if 
*
nn kk ≤ . Moreover, 
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kk
nn n nn p k p ck P k n k ck πν ν =− = + − − , so that 
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. 
Since  () 0
k Dp ′ <  it follows that  0 nn k π ∂∂ ≥  if ( )( ) ( ) 0 nn nk Kk νϕ − −≤ , or if 
() () nn f kg k ≤  or 
*
nn kk ≤  . It follows that  ( ) ( )
k
nn p k π is increasing in  n k  for 
*
1 nn kkk ≤≤ 
with  () () ( )
* ko
nn n p kp ππ = .  
  To see that  ( ) () 1
o
n p k π is decreasing in 1 k , note that  ( ) 1
o p k is decreasing in  1 k  and that 
()
o
n p π  is increasing in 
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om p p <  and     
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oo ooo o o
nn p p c p Dp p cDp p n π αϕ ν = −= − − . 
 Moreover, for  ( ) 1
b kD pn =  we obtain 
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so that 
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  Finally, to see that  () () () ( ) ( )
om m m
n p Dp n p cDp n π >−  we note that 




nn nn n p kk p kk p kk πππ =>, 
and that if  ( ) 1
m
n kkD pn ==  then  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 ,
km m
n p kk p cDp n π =− .   
 
PROPOSITION 1. If 
um p p ≥  or, equivalently,  ( ) 1
m kD pn ≤ , then: 
   ( ) argmax
k
n p p π = if 
*
1 nn kkk ≤ ≤ , 
   ( ) argmax n p π = 
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Proof. If 
um p p ≥  then obviously  ( ) argmax n p p π =  and the rest follows from Lemma 1 
since  () ( ) 1
mb n k Dp Dp ≤<. 
 
  Next we consider the case when 
um p p ≤  or, equivalently,  ( ) 1
m kD pn ≥ . Then the 
monopolistic option, 
   () ( ) ( )
mm m
n p pc D pn π =− , 
is always available to a big firm and must be compared to  ( ) n p π  . The outcome of this 
comparison is as follows:  
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Proof. If  () 1
b nk D p ≥  then 
u p p =  (according to Lemma 1), and since 
um p p ≤  (by 
assumption) it follows that  ( ) argmax
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  We finally derive expressions for 
o p  and the critical capacities 
*
n k , 
*
1 k  and 
r
n k when the 
demand function is linear. 
 
LEMMA 2. Suppose that the demand function is linear,  ( ) ( )( ) Dp Dc bp c = −− . Then 
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PROPOSITION 3. If the demand function is linear then: 
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Proof. Using Lemma 2 the equation for 
o p  can be written as 
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which is solved by  1 12 zx n ν =− . 
  Secondly, according to Lemma 2, 























so that the equation for 
*
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 Thirdly, 
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so that the equation  () ( )( )( ) 1
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which is solved by 
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